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DECISION THEORY AS PRACTICE: 
CRAFTING RATIONALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper explores the underlying practices whereby rationality – as defined in rational 
choice theory – is achieved within organizations.  The qualitative coding of 58 case study 
reports produced by decision analysts, working in a wide range of settings highlights how 
organizational actors can make decisions in accord with the axioms of rational choice 
theory.  Our findings describe the emergence of ‘decision-analysis’ as a field and reveal 
the complex and fragile socio-technical infrastructure underlying the craft of rationality, 
the central role of calculability, and the various forms of bricolage that decision-analysts 
deploy to make rational decisions happen.  Overall, this research explores the social 
construction of rationality and identifies the practices sustaining the performativity of 
rational choice theory within organizations. 
 
 
Key-words: Bricolage – Calculability – Decision-Analysis – Performativity – Rational 
Decision-Making.  
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DECISION THEORY AS PRACTICE: 
CRAFTING RATIONALITY IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
‘Economic rationality is not like Newton’s laws, which are supposed 
to be at work everywhere in the universe. It is a fragile property that 
must be carefully preserved by creating a hospitable environment.’ 
Guala (2007: 147) 
The rationality of organizational decision-making processes is a central topic in 
organization theory (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 1992; Hodgkinson and Starbuck 2008; 
March 1978).  The rationalistic model, also called ‘synoptic’ or ‘comprehensive’ model 
(Fredrickson 1984; Hendry 2000) has proven fertile ground for both its proponents and its 
opponents alike (March 2006).  Research based on this model clarified the effects of 
various external and internal variables on the adoption of comprehensive (or exhaustive) 
decision-making processes (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988).  It also studied the 
consequences of comprehensive decision-making processes on organizational 
performance (Dean and Sharfman 1996; Fredrickson 1984). 
Yet, this model has drawn its share of critics.  The process school valuably 
complemented the rationalistic approach by uncovering the diversity of decision-making 
processes that organizations adopt (Mintzberg et al. 1976; Nutt 1984).  It highlighted the 
various rationalities that inhabit organizations, such as the bounded (Allison 1971; March 
and Simon 1958; Simon 1955), political (Allison 1971; Crozier and Friedberg 1980; 
Pettigrew 1973), and institutional rationalities (Lounsbury 2008; March and Olsen 1989).  
This approach also unveiled the various uses, often symbolic, of formal decision-making 
tools in organizations (Langley 1989; Laroche 1995; Meyer and Rowan 1977).  Lastly, 
critical perspectives on organizational decision-making challenged the concept of a 
‘decision’ itself and demonstrated the potential irrationality of organizational decisions, 
(Brunsson 2007; Chia 1994; Cohen et al. 1972; Sfez 1973; Starbuck 1983; Tsang 2004). 
While they have proven rich with insights, the different paradigms on organizational 
decision-making have nonetheless neglected crucial aspects of the phenomenon (Hendry 
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2000; Langley et al. 1995; Laroche 1995).  In particular, missing from this research is an 
analysis of the socio-technical conditions enabling the construction of rational decisions – 
as defined in rational choice theory – within organizational contexts.2 
Three main reasons, we argue, explain this lack of interest for the concrete 
conditions that sustain managers’ efforts to make rational decisions.  First, rationality – as 
used in rational choice theory –, is treated as a property that organizations have (or do not 
have) rather than an outcome of a purposive work undertaken by actors inside the 
organization.  This taken-for-granted view on rationality is a common feature of works 
either advocating (Dean and Sharfman 1996) or challenging (Brunsson 2007) rational 
forms of decision-making. 
Second, decision-making research neglects the potential influence of normative 
theories of choice on organizational activities through teaching and prescription.  
Although the economic model of choice remains the benchmark of most teaching 
exercises on decision-making (Czarniawska 2003; Langley 1989), its potential normative 
influence on organizations has rarely been evaluated. 
Finally, organizational researchers focus on decision-making processes rather than 
on the concrete practices of organizational decision-makers.  Accordingly, they miss the 
role that material artefacts play in decision-making processes.  Yet, some of the artefacts 
used by organizational actors embody a rational conception of decision-making.  Hence, 
they could act as ‘rationality carrier’ and diffuse rationality through organizations.  Thus, 
the ‘lost’ rationality of organizational decision-making (Laroche 1995) could be simply 
                                                
2 As highlighted above, there is no consensus on what rationality is.  Garfinkel (1967), for instance, 
identified up to fourteen forms of rationality.  In this paper, we use the terms ‘rationality’ and ‘rational 
decision-making’ to refer to a specific view on rationality, that of rational choice theory (also called 
decision theory).  From this perspective, a rational behaviour consists in evaluating the consequences of 
one’s actions and choosing the actions that are consistent with one’s preferences and beliefs so as to 
maximize one’s expected utility.  We adopt this specific view on rationality not due to any normative stance 
of our own but rather because it is how the decision analysts, whom we are studying, define the term. 
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hidden in the ‘missing masses’ of organizational life (Latour 1992: 225), that is, its 
largely neglected materiality (Latour 1994; Orlikowski 2007). 
This article seeks to address these blind spots and to develop an organizational 
theory of the craft of rational decisions in organizations.  To uncover the underlying 
practices that allow making rational decisions, we combine insights from research of the 
practice perspective (Reckwitz 2002; Whittington 2006) with the economic sociology 
analyses of perfomativity and calculability (Callon 1998; Callon et al. 2007).  This 
perspective allows analyzing rational decision-making as a social construction that 
involves a theory (rational choice theory) and, a set of tools and artefacts embedding the 
theory’s core assumptions (Cabantous and Gond forthcoming; Cabantous et al. 2008). 
Such an empirical exploration of the craft of rationality would not be possible 
without the existence of a professional body of experts in decision-making prescribing a 
normative view on rational decision-making within organizations: the so-called decision 
analysts.  Instead of abandoning the assumptions of rational choice theory because of 
their lack of realism, decision analysts intervene in organizational reality and attempt to 
make it fit with rational choice theory.  Hence, in studying the emergence of this field, we 
can explore the processes whereby rational choice theory may progressively be turned 
into social reality.  Moreover, a systematic content analysis of 58 case study reports 
produced by those experts shows the very concrete practices and socio-technical 
processes that sustain the making of a ‘rational decision-maker’. 
The article proceeds as follows.  Part 1 defines the core concepts – practice, 
performativity and calculability – that guide our study of the craft of rational decisions in 
organizations.  Part 2 introduces the data and method deployed to investigate the craft of 
rational decisions within organizations.  Parts 3 and 4 present the findings.  We conclude 
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with a discussion showing the main implications of this work for future research on 
rationality, organizational decision-making and performativity. 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
Our empirical exploration of the craft of rational decision within organizations is 
guided by three core concepts: practice, performativity and calculability.  These derive 
from the social practice perspective in organization studies (Reckwitz 2002; Whittington 
2006) and the research of economic sociologists Callon and Latour whose anthropology 
of markets offers a language for describing the material and the social construction of 
economic activity (Callon 1998; Latour 1996).  This part introduces these concepts and 
explains how they support our investigation of rational decision-making as a socially 
constructed phenomenon within organizations. 
Practice 
Rationality is something that people achieve (Garfinkel 1967).  It is the product of 
social interaction and collaboration, not merely an organizational characteristic.  As such, 
rational decision-making, like any form of strategizing, must be conceived as a social 
practice (Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki et al. 2001).  Its existence involves the co-presence of 
three constitutive elements: actors involved in decision-making (practitioners), tools and 
models enabling their actions (practice) as well as actors’ activities (praxis) 
(Jarzabkowski et al. 2007; Whittington 2007). 
A practice perspective suggests focusing with a ‘sociological eye’ (Hughes 1971; 
Whittington 2007) on the thick processes whereby rationality is instantiated within 
organization.  It thus moves beyond a variance approach to rationality (Mohr 1982) that 
considers it as a given ‘state’ that can be exogenously assessed (Dean and Sharfman 
1996).  Such an approach allows observing rationality ‘in-the-making’ within 
organizations, i.e. the craft or actual practice of rational decision-making.  It also sees 
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rational decision-making as an organizational actors’ performance – in Goffman (1959)’s 
sense of the term. 
Performativity 
The concept of performativity is the second pillar that supports our conceptual 
framework (Callon 1998).  This notion has moved from the laboratory of social studies of 
sciences (Latour 1987) to the field of economic sociology where it refers to the specific 
influence of economic theory on actual economic practices (Callon 1998; MacKenzie and 
Millo 2003).  From the performativity perspective, ‘economics does not describe an 
existing external ‘economy’, but brings that economy into being: economics performs the 
economy, creating the phenomena it describes’ (MacKenzie and Millo 2003: 108).  
Broadly defined, performativity encompasses the whole set of processes whereby a 
theory influences the reality it describes and thus increases its verisimilitude and 
ultimately its social success (Callon 2007; Latour 1996).  MacKenzie (2004, 2007) 
distinguishes several types of performativity depending on their degree of influence on 
economic activities.  In the weaker and most common case of ‘generic performativity’ 
economic actors use in their practices an aspect of economics (e.g., an assumption, a 
model, a concept).  Performativity becomes ‘effective’ when the practical use of an aspect 
of economics has an impact on economic processes themselves (MacKenzie 2007: 55-
56).  Last, in the less frequent yet stronger case of ‘Barnesian performativity’, the use of 
economics over time (‘generic performativity’) not only alters economic processes 
(‘effective performativity’), but does so in a way that makes them more and more similar 
to their depiction by economics (MacKenzie 2007: 67). 
Performativity research shows that the core principles of economics shape 
management practices, tools, norms and language, and subsequently frame the business 
world according to the behavioural assumptions of this theory (Ferraro et al. 2005; 
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MacKenzie 2006).  For example, the adoption of market-like relationships between 
employees and employers in the last twenty years has created outcomes that conform to 
the economic assumption of self-interested actors.  As a result, employers no longer feel 
any social obligation or moral tie to their employees, while at the same time, employees’ 
loyalty and trust has decreased (Ferraro et al. 2005: 18-19).  Hence, performativity draws 
our attention to the various processes whereby economic theory may influence 
management practices.  Even so performativity processes do not lead systematically to 
theory self-realization; they still shape actors’ social reality, language, and practices. 
Calculability 
Finally, the rich body of research on calculative practices provides us with a third 
complementary lens to investigate the practice of rational decision-making within 
organizations (Callon and Muniesa 2005; Miller 2001; Porter 1996).  Calculability is 
broadly defined as a three step process of ‘[…] isolating objects from their context, 
grouping them in the same frame, establishing original relations between them, 
classifying them and summing them up’ (Callon and Muniesa 2005: 1232).  This 
definition encompasses the qualitative and organizational work that sustains the 
production of figures (‘first order measurement’) as well as the narrow view on 
calculability as the application of calculative techniques to pre-existing figures (‘second 
order measurement’) (Power 2004). 
Research on how economics shapes ordinary economic activity highlights the 
central role of tools and practices aiming at making things ‘calculable’.  Calculability is a 
necessary condition to the construction of markets (Callon and Muniesa 2005).  
Calculative practices have also played a crucial role in the processes whereby modern 
financial theory assumptions have been turned into social reality for actors (MacKenzie 
2006).  Because the theory decision analysts rely on assumes the existence of strong 
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calculative capacities from actors, we expect calculability to play an important role in the 
constitution of rational forms of decision-making. 
In sum, we see rationality – as defined in rational choice theory – as a ‘fragile 
product’ (Guala 2007: 143) and we seek to highlight its organizational ‘conditions of 
felicity’, i.e. the social conditions thanks to which it could be achieved within 
organizations (Bourdieu 1991).  We thus complement research on organizational 
decision-making by revealing the practices underlying the concrete craft of rationality, 
and by examining the relationship between rational choice theory, decision-making social 
processes and tools. 
METHOD AND DATA 
Because previous studies suggest that rationality is seldom enacted in organizations 
(Langley 1989), we did not follow the traditional method that consists in selecting a 
representative sample of decisions within a given industrial or cultural context (Dean and 
Sharfman 1996; Langley 1989).  Instead, we focused on a set of decisions that experts of 
rational choice theory regard as fulfilling the criteria of rationality.  This led us to study a 
community of practitioners of decision-making, the ‘decision analysts’ (Howard 1966; 
Raiffa 2002). 
For analytical purposes, we study the decision analysis community on two levels.  
On one level (which we refer to as our first order findings), we offer an account of the 
emergence of this community.  This historical process helps us to understand the process 
whereby rational choice theory has been translated into organizational contexts.  On 
another level (which we refer to as our second order findings), we study the reports 
produced by decision analysts within their community of practice.  Decision analysts 
produce reports called ‘applications’ for the express purpose of sharing experiences of 
decision-making techniques applications within organizations with their peers. 
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Though it may appear somewhat indirect and even paradoxical to rely on 
‘secondary data’ for studying ‘practice in context’, four arguments justify this data set.  
First, these reports provide rich accounts of decision analysts experience within 
organizations and have been produced with the aim of supporting the adoption of decision 
analysis ‘best practices’ across a broad range of organizations.  Second, the fact that 
several of the most prominent scholars from the field produced ‘applications’ 
demonstrates the value granted to this exercise by decision analysts as well as the 
legitimacy of this material within the decision analysis field.  Third, though these data 
represent a ‘theorized’ form of prior practice, it is nevertheless a reflexive exercise 
produced by the decision analysts on their own practice.  Arguably, applications capture 
an important part of the ‘living memory’ of this field’s and open a window on its 
collective cognition (Walsh 1995).  It usefully highlights some of its most famous and 
valued practices.  Fourth and finally, these applications are publically available and can 
easily be subject to a systematic content analysis.  
Sampling of Decision Analysis Applications 
To gather reference and reports of efforts to perform rational choice theory in 
organizations, we relied on Corner and Kirkwood (1991) and Keefer et al. (2004).  These 
articles provide an exhaustive list of 172 applications published in operational research 
and management science English-language journals from 1970 to 2001 (e.g. Operations 
Research, Management Science, Interfaces).  These applications are case histories 
documenting the use of decision analytic methods, defined as ‘a set of quantitative 
methods for analyzing decisions based on the axioms of consistent choice’ (Corner and 
Kirkwood 1991: 206-207). 
The present research relies on a sub-sample of 58 applications published in 
Interfaces over the period 1970-2001 (see Table A in appendix for the full list).  With 
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34% of the published applications over the period, Interfaces – a bimonthly journal of 
INFORMS created in 1970 – is the major outlet for publication of decision analysis case 
studies.  By comparison, Operations Research, the Journal of the OR Society and 
Management Science have published together a total of 59 decision analysis applications 
over the period (26, 19 and 14 applications respectively). 
We selected applications from Interfaces because this journal is the application 
journal of INFORMS.  It positions itself at the interface between the academic world and 
the world of practice, as evidenced by its name and self-presentation: ‘[Interfaces is] 
dedicated to improving the practical application of operations research and management 
science (OR/MS) to decisions and policies in today's organizations and industries.’  
Moreover, this journal appeared as the richer source of information about what decision 
analysts concretely do to bring their model of choice into being in business contexts, as 
authors wishing to submit an application are asked to ‘provide details of the completed 
application, along with the results and impacts on the organization.’3 
The unit of analysis is the decision analysis application.  Interfaces’ applications are 
short reports (2-20 pages, mean = 10) explaining how some decision analysis techniques 
– such as utility and value elicitation, probability assessment and sensitivity analysis – 
have been implemented to help a decision-maker solve a problem.  Most applications take 
place in an organizational context.4 
Although they are retrospective accounts of attempts to enact the ideal rational 
decision-maker in organizations, Interfaces’ applications tell a lot about the concrete 
practice of construction of rational decisions within organizations.  Because these 
applications were written to help readers to ‘learn how to overcome the difficulties and 
                                                
3 Quote from the journal’s website: http://interfaces.pubs.informs.org/index.htm. 
4 See Dalkey (1981) and; Smith and Winkler (1999) in the Appendix for two exceptions. 
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issues encountered in applying OR/MS to real-life situations’, they do not hide the 
concrete efforts that decision analysts deploy to help organizational actors to be rational. 5 
As a text genre, applications are located somewhere between testimonies written by 
practitioners, and academic papers presenting decision analysis techniques used in 
context.  Interfaces’ case studies, contrary to applications published in other academic 
reviews, describe the techniques used to the extent that this allows readers to better 
understand the ‘art’ of decision analysis.  Interfaces’ applications therefore focus on the 
concrete practices that decision analysts use to discipline decision-makers subjective 
choices.  
Content analysis of 58 Interfaces applications 
We analyzed the content of Interfaces’ applications in two steps.  The first aimed at 
highlighting the conceptual stages that unfold during the process of rational decision-
making construction.  We focused our analysis on the core stages of the process, as our 
primary interest lies in the understanding of the construction (antecedents) of a rational 
decision rather than its symbolic effects (consequences).  Moreover, the description of the 
decision-making process appeared to be less subject to authors’ creative manipulation 
than the description of the consequences of the decision. 
A first analysis of a sample of applications revealed three main stages in the 
decision-making process: contextualization, quantification and calculation.  Using the 
software N-Vivo 7.0, we then coded systematically 50 applications along these categories 
(8 could not been turned into a format readable by the software and were manually 
analyzed).  Systematic analysis of the applications revealed the robustness of the three 
stages. 
                                                
5 http://interfaces.pubs.informs.org/index.htm. 
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Second, we investigated the socio-technical factors that may contribute to rational 
choice theory performativity.  To do so, we loosely relied on a model of rational decision-
making as a ‘performative praxis’ (Cabantous and Gond forthcoming).  This model is 
inspired by the practice and performativity perspectives (Callon 1998; Whittington 2006).  
It suggests that three underlying dimensions – decision-makers, rational decision-making 
tools and rational choice theory – contribute to bring rationality within organizations.  We 
coded a second time the whole set of 58 applications along these dimensions.  This 
process led to the stabilization of four categories contributing to the craft of rational 
decisions: (1) social processes and interactions, (2) tools and techniques, (3) decision 
analysts’ skills and competences, and (4) rational choice theory.   
Validating our Analysis: Interviews with Decision Analysts 
To complement the analysis of Interfaces’ applications, we interviewed 10 authors 
of these reports.  All together these 10 decision analysts published 15 of the 58 Interfaces 
applications of our sample. 
The interviews lasted between 40 and 140 min and were conducted between August 
2008 and February 2009.  Two interviews were face-to-face interviews; the remaining 8 
interviews were conducted over the telephone.  The interviews usually started with a brief 
presentation of the interviewee’s career and his/her motives to become a decision analyst.  
Decision analysts then talked concretely about their practices (e.g., the role of software, 
the skills required…).  We asked them to focus on one or two applications to illustrate 
their practice.  This allowed gathering insiders’ view on the ‘art’ of decision analysis and 
to collect reflexive insights from decision analysts about their practice within 
organizational contexts (Bartunek and Louis 1996).  These primary data confirmed many 
conclusions from our analysis of the secondary data and hence the relative robustness of 
our findings. 
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Thanks to these interviews, we obtained information about the aim of Interfaces 
applications.  This information confirms their role in the decision analysis field as a 
device capturing its ‘collective memory’.  We also gathered information about the context 
of some of the Interfaces’ applications of our sample.  We evaluated the accuracy of our 
analysis of the applications by confronting primary and secondary data and used this rich 
material to complete, when possible, our analysis of decision analysts practice.  
FIRST ORDER FINDINGS: HOW DECISION ANALYSIS EMERGED 
Historically, decision analysis emerged in the 1960s as a discipline distinct from 
decision theory, system modelling and operations research (Miles 2007).  Its corpus of 
knowledge is built on two main foundations.  The first is the subjectivist (or Bayesian) 
school of probability of Ramsey and De Finetti, which holds (contrary to the frequentist 
or statistical school) that probabilities are ‘degrees of belief’ or states of mind rather than 
states of objects (Savage 1954).  The second is the economic approach of utility 
measurement (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), which holds that a rational 
decision-maker is someone who makes decisions guided by maximising his/her 
subjective expected utility and who is committed to process information through Bayes’s 
theorem (Edwards et al. 2007).  This commitment implies that s/he will ensure that 
his/her preferences respect several axioms, (such as the transitivity axiom) and that 
his/her beliefs follow Kolmogorov axioms for probability (e.g., they are additive) and 
conform to Bayes’ rule.  Table I gives the full list of rational choice theory axioms. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
In Table I, Axiom 1a simply states that the decision problem has to be structured in 
such a way that the decision-maker sees at least two alternatives.  Without at least two 
alternatives, no decision analysis can be carried out.  Coupled with Axiom 1b, axiom 1a 
leads the decision-maker to compare the consequence of each plausible alternative. 
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The remaining axioms discipline the decision-makers’ beliefs and preferences and 
ensure that the subjective expected value of each option can be computed.  Axiom 2 
ensures that a decision-maker’s beliefs have the same properties as statistical 
probabilities.  Imagine a decision-maker who has identified two mutually exclusive 
events A and B.  If she believes that the probability of A is p; then axiom 2 states that she 
must believe that the probability of B is 1-p.  If she does not, she has to reflect on her 
beliefs.  She might have to reflect on the alternatives as well, because the non-additivity 
of her beliefs might reveal that the alternatives do not entirely capture her own 
representation of the decision problem.  Axioms 3 and 4 ensure that the decision-maker 
has transitive preferences and hence cannot be made worse off after a sequence of choices 
where she systematically chooses her preferred option. 
Since its inception, decision analysis has exhibited a strong applied orientation, as 
evidenced by the title of Howard (1966)’s paper ‘Decision Analysis: Applied decision 
theory’ that coined the term ‘decision analysis’.  This seminal work emerged from a 
consultancy work that Howard did for General Electrics at that time (Howard 2007). 
Raiffa, another father of decision analysis confirms this early orientation in his account of 
the history of the discipline (Howard 1992).  He explains his intuition that the decision 
theory course he was teaching at Columbia was ‘largely irrelevant for decisional 
purpose’.  He argues that the course material – rooted in the frequentist interpretation of 
probability – failed to capture uncertainty and ignored important characteristics of real 
decision contexts.  A couple of years after he was introduced to the subjectivist approach, 
he joined Harvard Business School.  There, he and his colleague Schlaiffer developed an 
applied version of decision theory specifically tailored for business managers and based 
in the judgmental inputs of knowledgeable organizational actors (Raiffa 2002).  In 
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essence, then, decision analysis is an applied discipline; and decision analysts frequently 
reaffirm that this discipline ‘must be applied to be mastered’ (Corner 1997: 134). 
This applied focus goes hand in hand with a strong prescriptive orientation that 
shapes the professional identity of the members of this field (Keeney and Raiffa 1976).  
For decision analysts, the aim of the profession is to help decision-makers to make better 
decisions by using normative models.  It is ‘the normative practice of decision-making’ 
and ‘consists of a theoretical paradigm for decision making and a body of practical 
experiences for using this paradigm to illuminate the decision problem for the decision 
maker’ (Howard 1980: 6).  At the core of this prescriptive project are the belief that 
‘although we are not perfect decision makers, we can do better through more structure 
and guidance’ (Clemen and Reilly 2001: 4), and the conviction that decision analysis 
provides the right structure for business decisions. 
Decision analysis’ prescriptive orientation is evidenced by the wide-ranging 
consultancy work done by the academic leaders of the field.  For example, Ralph Keeney 
served as the head of the decision analysis division of Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 
between 1976 and 1983.  Detlof Von Winterfeld (University of Southern California) is 
Associate at Decision Insights Inc. a US consultancy firm specialized in ‘quantitative 
problem solving and decision making’; and Rex Brown (School of Public Policy, George 
Mason University), a co-founder of the Decision Analysis Society, did some consultancy 
work on behalf of Decision Science Associates and Management Analysis Centre. 6,7  As 
Edwards et al. (2007) put it, ‘Decision analysis is unabashedly normative in theory and 
thoroughly prescriptive in practice’ (p. 5).  Interestingly, such a willingness to ‘apply’ an 
abstract normative ideal to actual decision-making in organizational contexts has fuelled 
the process of theory performativity.  This situation contrasts with the case of finance 
                                                
6 This quote is extracted from the website of this consultancy: http://www.diiusa.com. 
7 For a detailed presentation of this organization, see: http://www.mainet.com/index.html. 
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performativity which results primarily from academics’ attempts to solve a specific 
category of pre-existing practical problems such as option pricing (MacKenzie 2006; 
MacKenzie and Millo 2003). 
To speed the institutionalisation of their discipline, the self-labelled ‘decision 
analysts’ have also, since the 1950s, grouped in trade associations.  Among many others: 
Decision Science Institute was created in 1968 with the mission to ‘facilitate the 
development and dissemination of knowledge in the diverse disciplines of the decision 
sciences through publication, conferences, and other services’ (see also the Institute for 
Operations Research and the Management Sciences, and the Decision Analysis Affinity 
Group). 8  Other evidence of the institutionalisation of the field includes the development 
of prescriptive decision science programs in numerous US universities (Keeney, See, and 
von Winterfeldt 2006).  These programs enhance the exposure of future managers to 
decision-analysis principles and facilitate the potential performativity of rational choice 
theory within organizations. 
This close relationship with the world of practice, as well as the multidisciplinary 
roots of the discipline (economics, psychological research on human judgment, computer 
science), have made the members of the profession aware of the practical problems of 
implementing decision theory in the real world.  Building on their experience, decision 
analysts have therefore dedicated most of their effort to the creation of tools (such as 
decision trees, influence diagrams and methods for eliciting probability judgments) 
aiming at supporting rational of decision-making and at ‘de-biasing’ decision-makers. 
Though extreme in nature, the historical construction of decision analysis reveals 
some aspects of the performativity process.  The institutional positioning in prestigious 
academic institutions (Harvard, Stanford) of early academic leaders of the field played 
                                                
8 Quote extracted from the decision science association website: http://www.decisionsciences.org/. 
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some part in the institutionalization of decision analysis.  Yet, beyond that, the decision 
analysis case shows the importance in the performativity process of the entrepreneurial 
role of early academic promoters who had a clear orientation towards practice.  Early 
academic decision analysts indeed deliberately decided to turn an abstract set of 
principles (decision theory or rational choice theory) into an ‘applied discipline’ (decision 
analysis).  They explicitly acknowledged the normative nature of the theory.  They 
realized that the gap between this normative ideal and what decision-makers naturally do 
called for an applied and prescriptive version of rational choice theory.  The early leaders 
of the field thus purposively worked at articulating an abstract body of knowledge while 
simultaneously applying it to a set of practical experiences of implementation within real 
decision-making contexts. 
This practical orientation was a key element to make the move from university to 
businesses possible.  One interviewee, a former Editor of the Practice Abstract Column in 
Interfaces, explained that the Practice Abstract column was the idea of a leader of the 
OR/MS field who wanted to incite practitioners to publish short and non-technical 
description of their projects so as to diffuse OR/MS techniques to non-specialists: 
‘But in the field in general […] there’s always been too much of a gap I think between practitioners 
and theory.  And this [the Practice Abstract column of Interfaces] is one of many, many attempts by 
the organizations involved to foster more dialogue between the two and to let people know… You 
know, basically what’s going on in their field who may not be avid readers of things like 
Management Science or Operations Research or whatever.  So it was kind of designed primarily in 
Interfaces, which is the applications journal of Informs basically.  
To give people capsule descriptions of what other people are doing you know, in your industry or in 
a different industry or whatever.  And from an academic standpoint, it was good as well because 
people could use those in their classes, as illustrations and I know I did that a number of times, real 
world applications where you know, here’s somebody that’s using decision trees and influence 
diagrams and tornado diagrams and this, that and the other, in a real problem.’ (Interview with a 
former editor of the Practice Abstract Column, Autumn 2008).  
Due to its specific location bridging business and academia, its prescriptive and 
practical orientations and its progressive institutionalization into professional associations 
and within prestigious universities, decision analysis offers itself as an ideal site to 
observe empirically the potential influence of rational choice theory on the practice of 
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decision-making.  The analysis of financial theory performativity by MacKenzie (2006) 
reveals that the academic institutionalization of mathematical finance in US business 
schools during the 1970’s is deeply intertwined with the rising use of equations, models 
and theoretical concepts on the trade floor.  Similarly, we might expect that the 
institutionalization of decision analysis might accompany the progressive embodiment of 
rational choice theory.  By analyzing how these decision analysts actually work within 
organizational contexts and translate their knowledge into practices, we seek to shed light 
on the process of rational choice theory performativity. 
SECOND ORDER FINDINGS: 
HOW DECISION ANALYSTS PERFORM RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
Our second order analysis of applications shows how decision analysts craft rational 
decisions through the construction of a socio-technical infrastructure supporting the 
calculability of rational decisions.  The analysis reveals a three-step process model of 
‘contextualization’, ‘quantification’ and ‘calculation’ that refines and extends previous 
works on calculability construction (Callon 1998; Callon and Muniesa 2005; Power 
2004).  Figure 1 depicts graphically our framework.  It articulates the process of rational 
choice theory performativity with the underlying practices that decision analysts 
undertake to craft rational decisions.  Figure 1 also specifies the performativity process by 
pointing to inputs and outcomes of each stage of decision analysis. 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
The remainder of this section identifies the practices that underlie the craft of 
rational decisions and thus may contribute to rational choice theory performativity.  We 
describe the main components of each pattern composing the framework and explain how 
their succession leads to the performance of rational choice theory.  For each component, 
we show its empirical grounding.  Each section demonstrates how the practices that 
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emerged from the coding may contribute to the process of rational choice theory 
performativity. 
Contextualization 
Contextualization emerged as the first stage in the work of decision analysts.  The 
aim of this work is to create a fit between the organizational context and decision-analysis 
principles (see Figure 1, Stage 1).  It consists mainly in turning a ‘big and messy’ 
situation into a ‘decision-analyzable problem’.  In other word, it consists in creating a 
decision context congruent with the first two axioms of rational choice theory and 
susceptible to management with decision analysis techniques.  To phrase it in the term of 
decision analysis, it is about ‘getting the decision context right’ and ‘structuring the 
elements of the decision situation into a logical framework’ (Clemen and Reilly 2001: 
43).  Such a straightforward account of the process should not hide the important socio-
technical work that emerged from the data.  
The coding of this stage makes clear – as observed by Latour (1987) or Porter 
(1996) – that the contextualisation work relies heavily on social interactions and the 
construction of a network of allies.  Beyond a discussion with key decision-makers, 
understanding of the problem and gaining access to crucial information both require 
analysts to establish relationships with many organizational actors, including technicians, 
managers, and members of the support staff affected by the problem.  Slicing the actual 
decision-making process into tractable units of analysis and selecting the relevant 
dimensions of the context can require intensive investment into data-collection through 
interviews, surveys, observations and/or informal meetings. 
‘When I began my investigation, there were no existing studies on how surgeons made decisions. It 
was therefore necessary to generate hypotheses for testing.  Interviews were conducted with 38 
randomly selected surgical specialists. This group represented approximately one out of every 25 
surgical specialists in Philadelphia. All surgical disciplines were represented, including obstetrics, 
ophthalmology, and oral surgery as well as the more obvious subspecialties.  [...]  The hypotheses 
were also tested using information elicited from observation and critique of 103 unselected surgical 
decisions made by surgical specialists in our medical school hospital.’ (Clarke 1987) 
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This approach can blur organizational boundaries in order to generate the 
knowledge needed to make sense of the decision-making process: 
‘We began by forming a cross-functional team consisting of scientists and other staff members from 
clinical development, finance, marketing, project management, regulatory affairs, and 
manufacturing.’ (Beccue 2001) 
 
Moreover, far from being unilaterally decided by the analysts, the representation of the 
parameters and the structure of the decision are usually negotiated with organizational 
members during meeting, workshops, or formal interviews.   
Decision analysts can rely on specific practices to support this process of collective 
negotiation over the enactment of a consensual decision context.  In virtually all the 
coded applications, decision analysis artefacts such as decision-trees, influence diagrams 
and strategy generation tables, were mobilized to perform the work of contextualization.  
These tools derive directly from decision theory and equip analysts with the ‘calculative 
prostheses’ of rational economic actors (Callon 1998).  They facilitate the enactment of 
the decision context through the multiple roles they play.  Because of their graphical 
form, they provide a visual aid helping organizational actors to filter the relevant 
dimensions of the context.  They also support the collective discussion over the important 
parameters of the decision.  Lastly, they materialize a consensus over the representation 
of the decision context.  The following quotes illustrate some of these various roles: 
‘After an issues-raising session, we used strategy tables to narrow some 10,000 possible 
development options into eight well defined and plausible strategies. We used influence diagrams to 
help us to identify the important parameters necessary for valuing each strategy and to serve as the 
road map for the data-collection process.’ (Beccue 2001) 
‘As they spoke [during the strategic objective elicitation sessions], I made three lists: one for 
statements that indicated objectives, one for issues that should be addressed, and one for 
opportunities that could be taken. After writing down each person's initial thoughts, I guided the 
discussion into areas that had perhaps been only lightly covered. For instance, I might ask, ‘what are 
Seagate Software's objectives for its customers?’’ (Keeney 1999) 
‘The decision-tree display is useful to managers, particularly because it shows the after-tax cost of a 
dry hole for each option, which was different from the cost to the capital budget.’ (Walls et al. 1995) 
Decision-trees exemplify the pedagogical and structuring roles of tools (Figure 2).  
According to one of their more enthusiastic promoters, their purpose was to allow ‘bright 
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but mathematically unsophisticated’ (Raiffa 2002: 81) business students from Harvard to 
cope with the statistical foundations of decision theory.  This simple tool is a perfect 
illustration of the work of pedagogical translation of rational choice theory that decision 
analysts can do.  A decision tree acts as a mediator between the organizational context for 
decision-making, managers, and the world of rational choice theory within which 
decision analysts are embedded.  Decision Trees play the role of ‘immutable and 
combinable mobiles’ (Latour 1987: 227) because they offer a pre-structured decision-
making template easily transportable from one context to another and fully coherent with 
the theory’s hypotheses.  They force organizational actors: (a) to structure the sequence of 
future events and actions while respecting the logic of causality, (b) to specify the 
alternative decisions, (c) to identify their main outcomes, and (d) to decide whether the 
various dimensions of the environment are given or actionable.  In short, decision trees 
evoke the very notion of a decision – a concrete choice among knowable options – and by 
doing so, they may bring the context of rational decision-making into being. 
The complexity of the issue, however, can easily threaten the contextualization 
exercise.  A condition as simple as (b) for instance, might appear obvious because the 
very definition of a decision implies a minima the existence of one alternative.  In 
practice, however, managers can face far too many alternatives or simply lack the ability 
to perceive the existence of any alternatives.  Applications reveal how decision-trees are 
tailored to re-specify these extreme situations into tractable ‘decision problems’.  A one-
branch tree is used to select a project (Hess 1993).  A probability tree allows at least 
structuring the uncertainty in a case where choices are missing (Keefer 1995).  A 
‘Christmas tree’ combining simultaneously a high number of decision-trees is used to 
synthesize the dozen of merchandising strategies for Amoco (Dyer and Lund 1982).  
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Through these conceptual or material bricolages, analysts recreate the fit between the 
textbook stylized decision situation and the actual context. 
Decision analysis applications therefore suggest that analysts’ cognitive and 
practical flexibilities are crucial competences needed to enact a hospitable environment 
for rational decision-making.  Decision analysis demands the ability to negotiate some 
compromise between organizational actors who have to adhere to the decision project and 
the organizational context whose routines may contradict the decision analysis approach.  
This delicate balance is illustrated by the following quote: 
‘Initially, the team was overwhelmed by the quantity of information required in a short time frame. 
For example, some of the information was unavailable or uneconomic to obtain. Reflecting back at 
the end of the process, the team members agreed that, although such rigorous data collection was not 
common at Amgen, it was critically important in this instance, and that the decision-analysis 
approach made it manageable.’ (Beccue 2001) 
Although in many cases, the role of theory in contextualization seems to be limited 
to ritual references, the content analysis suggests that it plays an important role as a 
normative guide.  For instance, prior applications provide ideas for representing or 
modelling problems in specific domains of applications such as medical treatment (Hazen 
et al. 1998).  Prior academic knowledge is used to justify the appropriateness of 
structuring methodologies (Keeney 1999).  Theory also structures the process because 
both tools and analysts are embedded technically and cognitively (respectively) within 
rational choice theory. 
Contextualization is therefore the progressive enactment of the first two axioms of 
decision theory (see Stage 1 in Figure 1).  The decision situation is re-specified by 
detaching the key elements of the decision situation (i.e., a finite number of parameters, 
uncertainties and alternative courses of action) from the decision context (Latour 1987).  
Once detached these elements are re-arranged logically into a new ‘calculative space’ 
(Callon and Muniesa 2005: 1231) fitting the analytical categories of decision theory.  In 
organizing the reconciliation between a messy problem, an organizational context and the 
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notion of decision as understood by decision analysis, contextualization recreates the 
‘first order measurement’ that is needed to realize sophisticated forms of calculation 
(Power 2004).  Once projected into a new common calculative space for decision brought 
in by analysts (e.g., the graph on which the decision-tree is represented, the paper-board 
listing the alternatives generated by the generation table), the ‘detached’ and ‘rearranged’ 
dimensions of problems can be reduced to a list of items that can be quantified. 
Quantification 
As Stage 2 in Figure 1 shows, the quantification of the structured but qualitative 
representation of the decision situation is the next step in the process leading to rational 
choice theory performativity.  This stage consists mainly in turning decision parameters 
into numbers and changing the decisional context into ‘a [micro] world made safe for 
numbers’ (Porter 1996: 46). 
To some extent decision analysts can rely on the calculative infrastructure that 
exists within the organization.  As the quotes below illustrate, databases and figures 
produced by management accounting systems and/or organizational routines usually 
provide some of the decision parameters: 
‘It is important to emphasize that this approach does not ignore “hard” objective data when it is 
available. Rather, the model provides the logic for combining data and judgments in an explicit, 
consistent manner. In our case, profit margin data for the various products and cost data for the 
alternate merchandising strategies were processed according to the specifications of a judgmental 
model.’ (Dyer 1982:42) 
 
‘Given the short time period of the project, we knew from the beginning that we would have to 
make the best use of data that were already developed and to use judgment where data were 
lacking. A lot of data were developed by the Postal Service, GAO, manufacturers, OTA’s technical 
consultant, and others. The data available were not exactly the data required to address the task, 
and some had to be judgmentally adjusted. This is the usual situation for a decision analysis  
(Ulvila 1988: 75-76) 
Decision analysis however does not exclusively rely on the numbers routinely produced 
by organizations.  As the Amgen quotes above (p. 21) illustrates, the data needed are 
likely to go beyond the existing figures available in the organization, requiring 
information that is either ‘unavailable or uneconomic to obtain’ (Beccue 2001). 
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Yet, a key feature of decision analysis is that it extensively relies on judgmental 
inputs that are not commonly available in a quantified format in organizations.  
Generally, many of the entities common to decision theory textbooks and crucial to 
performing rational choice theory (e.g., utility functions, subjective probabilities) do not 
exist as such in organizations.  As with the case of statistical categories (Desrosières 
1990) or scientific experimentation (Hacking 1983; Latour 1987) so measuring actually 
entails ‘making things’, that is; creating new entities (Porter 1996). 
Even more than contextualization, quantification builds on an intensive deployment 
of social interactions by analysts.  To put numbers corresponding to these new entities 
(the nodes and squares of the decision tree for instance), analysts spend a lot of time 
gathering ‘soft’ subjective or qualitative information from organizational actors.  They 
have to identify and enlist ‘experts’, i.e. actors having a good knowledge of the situation 
and context, so that the data they provide fulfil the essential condition of credibility and 
reliability.  Through expert panels, meetings, face-to-face interviews, focus groups or 
quantitative surveys, they assess subjective beliefs about the likelihood of outcomes 
and/or subjective evaluations of the values of the outcomes of the decision. 
‘To assess the schedule uncertainties, we convened three panels of schedule specialists, with about 
10 technical staff members of the DOE Office of Reconfiguration, its contractors and consultants 
in each panel. We selected the participants for their knowledge of tritium-supply alternatives and 
their understanding of schedule uncertainties.’ (Von Winterfeld and Schweitzer 1998) 
‘To get an objective and credible analysis, we based our evaluation on the judgments of five teams 
of Air Force officers.’ (Burk and Parnell 1997) 
‘How did you choose the values for the USPS estimate adjustment factors that you used? How did 
you convince your sponsors that those were the best numbers to use? U: The values were based on 
discussions with the OTA, GAO, and the technical consultant, and on information in various 
documents. Fred Wood was involved in all of the discussions, and he reviewed.’ (Ulvila 1988:76) 
Constructing these figures necessitates making trade-offs between conflicting 
assessments of experts, managing actors’ anxieties, and overcoming their reluctance to 
provide quantified information.  It is a process of permanent negotiation with actors and 
context that balances the level of accuracy of the information and the possibility to 
quantify it. 
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‘More important, management was uncomfortable estimating probabilities, let alone expressing 
levels of uncertainty about them.  Monte Carlo simulation would likely raise management 
anxieties about probabilities even further.  We elected instead to explore the optimistic and 
pessimistic parameter values rather than do a simulation.’ (Hess 1993) 
‘In the OPC study, we had too little time for in-depth assessments. Instead, we conducted 
probability assessments quickly with the expectation that extensive probabilistic sensitivity 
analysis later would reveal where refinement was necessary. For each chance event, the 
appropriate experts joined the analytic team to discuss the formulation and provide the needed 
inputs.’ (Borrison 1995) 
Analysts depend heavily on organizational actors, who are providers of subjective 
judgments, of any information that can serve as an input in the quantification process.  
Without mobilizing them, decision analysis cannot be conducted.  Numerous tools and 
techniques, such as utility elicitation methods that allows the construction of the decision-
maker’s utility function, or methods for eliciting probability judgments assist analysts in 
their work of quantification.  Actors use these tools to quantify their qualitative 
knowledge and to turn non-observable entities such a ‘utilities’ into figures. 
‘This may be done by introducing two additional pieces of information into the analysis. The first is 
an assessment of the user's subjective probabilities of all relevant future events (the seven techno 
economic uncertainties plus the two proliferation/diversion uncertainties in this case); for instance, 
each user would be asked for his probability assessments that the uranium resource base would be 
high, medium, or low.’ (Peck 1980) 
Whatever the method at hand, the decision analysis axioms play a key role in the 
process.  In the case of probability elicitation judgements for instance, decision-maker’s 
beliefs pass through a measurement discipline constraining his/her subjective beliefs 
about the likelihood of future events such that they conform to the axioms of decision 
theory.  Other methods such assessment of multi-attribute functions require fulfilling 
specific conditions. 
‘We assumed that the value model was linear. Our assessments showed that the required additive 
independence conditions [Keeney and Raiffa 1976] were approximately met.’ (Burk 1997) 
‘The new strategies were evaluated by direct assessment of the multiattribute utility function 
Equation (2). The fundamental assumption required for the existence of an additive multi-attribute 
utility function under conditions of certainty, as we have here, is called difference independence 
[Dyer and Sarin 1980]. Our own understanding of the problem coupled with responses from 
interviews suggested that this assumption was valid except for four cases.’ (Dyer and Lund 1982) 
The exigencies of both quantification and decision theory axiomatic make the task 
complex and put at stake the technical skills and the creativity of the analyst.  Dyer and 
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Lund (1982)’s application of decision analysis at Amoco provides the most striking 
illustration of socio-technical bricolage at the quantification stage: 
‘The methodology used in the study is a novel combination of judgmental modelling and multi-
attribute utility theory. We defined a hierarchic multi-attribute utility function to evaluate the impact 
of a merchandising strategy on full-facility service stations, and then used judgmental modelling to 
determine the weights for the objectives of the utility function.’  (Dyer and Lund 1982) 
To enable managers to understand and to assess the abstract weights of the objective of 
the utility function, the authors built a ‘tinker toy model’ representing spatially this 
function and the manner it links various decision options (reproduced on Figure 3). 
During an interview, Dyer remembered how Lund theatrically used this model: 
‘He [Lund] had told me that when he made his presentation internally in the company, he walked in 
and actually had the Tinker Toy model covered with a … like a towel, a piece of cloth.  And so he 
would make his initial comments about the issues associated with choosing what products to 
emphasise and what kinds of marketing strategies to emphasise and the difficulty of making those 
decisions in isolation because the sales of one product can influence the sales of another.  And after 
he’d made those general comments, then he would unveil his Tinker Toy model then ask the people 
to come and look at it and then he would try to point out that you know, one of those circles or 
wooden balls represented one product, another represented another product […]’. (Interview with 
Dyer, Autumn 2008). 
Managers stood around the model as they worked to put a number on each node.   
Several applications exhibit less spectacular but similar in nature attempts to build 
artefacts.  These artefacts allow analysts to negotiate with actors the quantitative values of 
the parameters while sticking to rational choice theory constraining axioms.  They help 
analysts to co-construct with organization members preferences and quantitative 
knowledge that may not have previously existed.  They also ensure that these quantities 
and preferences are similarly and conveniently structured.  Thus, organizational members 
come to see the world through the decision analyst’s lens with evidence carefully 
constructed to make them provide the data needed to make decision theory function. 
Theory embedded in a material artefact becomes a tool for bounding the reality 
analysts hope to construct.  Analysts refer often to theory in the sections dedicated to 
quantification.  This suggests that rational choice theory axioms deeply shape their 
practice.  Moreover, theory is directly referred to as a solution to very practical problem 
 28 
such as probability assessment.  It sets the standards that the quantification process has to 
achieve in order to ensure conformity with the axioms.  Theory plays, here, a role both as 
normative guide for action and as a toolbox where to find on to address an issue during 
quantification.  Once quantified, the various entities and parameters needed are now ready 
for the next and ultimate stage, calculation.  Decision trees are now ‘dressed’ (Figure 4).  
Once contextualization and calculability have putted in place the infrastructure that 
allows calculability, more sophisticated techniques of ‘second order measurement’ 
(Power 2004) can be mobilized to build the rational decision. 
Calculation 
At this point, the decision context fits with the required conditions prescribed by the 
axioms of rational choice theory (outcomes of Stage 2 on Figure 1), and organizational 
members are sufficiently prepared for finding a solution to their problems through 
decision analysis (Stage 3 on Figure 1).  Now, the final stage of calculation occurs.   
This stage consists in applying to the now quantified entities that constitute the 
decision problem some statistical and arithmetic techniques.  Contrary to the previous 
stages, calculation does not imply the development of new social interactions.  Rather, it 
is perhaps the absence of interaction – the seclusion of the decision analyst prior to the 
revealing of the problem’s solution – that may enhance the performance of rationality, the 
sense among organizational actors that something different; something ordinarily not 
present in the organizational context is underway. 
On the surface, the calculation stage involves the effective mobilization of entities 
previously quantified and the coordination of actants such as spreadsheets, computers and 
algorithms (MacKenzie 2006).  Except in a few cases where analyses reveal the need for 
data adjustment implying some interactions, applications suggest that calculation is more 
about desk research: 
 29 
‘This program involves a forward-looking simulation that shows the distribution of outcomes over an 
extended time period into the future, say 20 to 30 years (Figure 6). Investors would take a look at the 
distribution of returns— in the short run and the longer run—and then decide either to reduce or to 
increase their risks based on the pattern of contributions and the associated probabilities I would 
change the risk-aversion parameter as a consequence and rerun the models to generate new results.’ 
(Mulvey 1994)  
In that step, the coding reveals the crucial importance of tools such as statistical 
techniques and computers.  The extension of actors’ cognitive capacities through 
computer software suggests that actors’ rational capabilities may be artificially increased 
so that the decision-maker is able to maximize his/her utility function.  The technology 
creates a situation enabling the equipped decision-maker to behave according to 
economics’ hypotheses (Callon 1998).  Applications demonstrate the diversity of use of 
computers in this phase and show the improvement in calculation of rational decision due 
to technologies across time.  Recent applications mobilise, quasi systematically, software 
to solve the decision problem and/or to perform a sensitivity analysis. 
‘We implemented the model in a spreadsheet and then solved it using a popular Monte Carlo 
simulation add-in package.’ (Perdue et al. 1999) 
‘Levelized revenue requirements were calculated using computer models developed for that 
purpose.’ (Madden et al. 1983) 
‘A simulation model was constructed to estimate the expected net present value of buying and 
operating each of the four ship options.’ (Bell 1984) 
This stage also reveals the technical skills and know-how that are needed to solve 
the decision problem: analysts indeed often develop their own program (or combine 
existing software) to perform the calculations. 
‘I initially developed the WPRS in a spreadsheet using macros from Kirkwood [1997]. Since 
calculation of the evaluation measure scores for each WP required access to several databases used 
by EM project managers, we subsequently reprogrammed the WPRS into a database to reduce the 
time required to score the WPs.’ (Parnell 2001) 
‘The program is written in BASIC and has been run on a Control Data mainframe and on IBM and 
Radio Shack personal computers. BASIC allows a simple questioning interaction between negotiator 
and computer and allows the program to be run on most microcomputers.’ (Winter 1985) 
‘I developed a second program to assist in the calibration effort.’ (Mulvey 1994)  
In this stage, theory is more sparingly mobilized as such than in the previous stages 
and hence is less visible and explicitly present.  The whole stage nonetheless, is framed 
according to the core principle of rational choice theory.  Theory is converted into and 
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embodied within the various artefacts mobilized by decision analysts in their practices 
(Callon 1998; Latour 1994), as rationality itself is made real in practice.  Statistical and 
theoretical assumptions about calculated entities and parameters are embedded within the 
various algorithms used to perform the calculations.  As shown on Stage 3 in Figure 1, 
the final outcome of this stage is either an optimal ‘rational’ decision or a ranked set of 
options. 
Rational Choice Theory Performativity 
Overall, our three stage model describes how rational decisions have been 
progressively constructed and enacted.  From an empirical viewpoint, it suggests 
endowing rational choice theory with some forms of performativity.  First, our analysis 
uncovers the presence of “generic performativity”, as decision analysts mobilize in their 
practice – and over the various stages of contextualization, quantification, and calculation 
– certain concepts, models, and calculation techniques from economics.  For instance, 
data shows that in their practice, decision analysts mobilize the notion of “subjective 
probability”, build “decision trees” and can even turn managers’ “utility functions” into 
social reality through elicitation techniques (e.g. Keeney 1992).  Economic concepts and 
categories are thus brought into beings and populate decision-making processes. 
Second, our data reveals “effective performativity” by showing that through the 
works of decision analysts, rational choice theory “makes a difference”.  Decision 
analysts’ tools and engineering activities enact processes of decision-making that depart 
significantly from those previously observed within organization studies (Minzberg et al. 
1976; Nutt 1984).  For instance, Skaf (1999) contrasts the company portfolio 
management process before and after his intervention as follows: 
‘In the past, the ad hoc process favored the asset-team leader with either the strongest arguments or 
the most optimistic asset plan.  Now the organization has a process that engages asset teams and 
senior management from day one in identifying the best portfolio strategy for the business unit.’ 
(Skaf ,1999) 
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Generally, applications demonstrate that performing decision-analysis involves a 
work of data-collection and analysis that is far more systematic and rigorous than the in-
use modes of decision-making in the studied organizations (e.g. Beccue 2001; Dyer and 
Lund 1982).  Endorsement letters produced by managers and executives that accompany 
many applications (e.g., Dunning et al. 2001; Keeney 1999; Pate Cornel et al. 1994; Islei 
et al. 1991) provide further evidence of organizational changes and confirm the presence 
of “effective performativity”, as illustrated below. 
 ‘As General Manager, New Businesses, VP Health Imaging, Eastman Kodak, I encourage all of the 
business planners to use the decision and risk principles and processes as part of evaluating new 
business opportunities. The processes have clearly led to better decisions about entry and exit of 
businesses.’ (Clemen et al. 2001) 
 
Third, the enactment of rational decision within organizations may support the more 
lasting form of “Barnesian performativity” because the processes designed by decision 
analysts are sometimes “built-in”.  Such an organizational embeddedness of decision-
analysis enhances the verisimilitude of rational choice theory.  Although our research 
design does not allow the systematic assessment of this fact, some applications report a 
lasting impact of decision-analysis, for instance through the development of software 
packages and techniques that becomes integral parts of organizational decision-making 
routines (e.g., Islei et al. 1991; Parnel et al. 2001; Pate Cornel et al. 1994; Skaf 1999).  
This suggests that the existence of rational choice theory “Barnesian performativity” 
cannot be excluded.  Yet, this strong form of performativity remains empirically rare. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Crafting Rationality: Revealing Decision-Analysts Practices 
A first key contribution of our analysis is to specify the complex bundle of practices 
that sustains the craft of rationality.  As shown in Figure I, social and technical 
dimensions are intimately intertwined in a three stages process of contextualization, 
quantification and calculability that may lead to the enactment of a rational decision.  Our 
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study thus demonstrates that rationality is not solely a mode of social intelligence (March 
2006) but also a crafted product of organizational intelligence.  Crafting rationality 
requires a careful and patient work from well-trained analysts-engineers, and partially lies 
on the collective mobilization of social actors, theory and material artefacts. 
For instance, in the first two stages of the performativity process (see Figure I), 
practices that necessitate social competences and creativity, such as the practices 
deployed to collect judgmental inputs, are as crucial as technologies and formal analysis.  
In the third stage of the performativity process, machines, algorithms, and other 
‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour 1987: 227) are object of an intensive work of ‘bricolage’ 
from decision analysts.  Yet, calculating the optimal decision frequently involves 
programming or combining creatively various software applications.  In some rare 
applications, the software produced by decision-analysts became part of organizational 
routines, facilitating the consolidation of routines to sustain rationality. 
In the three stages, decision analysts are much closer to the creative socio-technical 
‘bricoleurs’ that Latour describes in his study of Aramis (Latour 1996), than to the cold 
engineers acting like machines (Morgan 1980), or the allies of conventionality and status 
quo that organizational critique of rationality often portrays (March 2006: 207-211).  
Their set of practices grants rationality its ‘sociomateriality’ in creating ‘assemblages’ of 
artefacts embedding a rational approach to decision-making (Orlikowski and Scott 2008).  
This paper thus calls for empirical studies approaching ‘rationality-as-practice’.  
Looking at rational decision-making as a social practice contributes to move 
organizational studies on decision-making beyond the lasting debate on the inherent 
rationality vs. irrationality of organizations and their decisions.  In this perspective 
rationality becomes something that organizations can acquire if they wish and devote 
their efforts to it.  This perspective is not so much an alternative to the rationalistic 
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paradigm (Hendry 2000) than a new way of understanding it ‘from inside’ with a 
different lens. 
Moreover, our findings can nurture future research adopting the rationalistic 
paradigm.  The present study stresses the role of actors’ reflexive mobilization of rational 
choice theory and the reliance upon tools embedding this theory’s hypotheses as 
important features of rational decision-making processes.  These factors could 
complement the criteria of exhaustive data collection that the construct of 
comprehensiveness suggests (Fredrickson 1984).  Hence, our results points to more 
appropriate proxies for assessing the degree of comprehensiveness in decision-making 
processes. 
Finally, in line with prior studies on strategy making (Samra-Frederick 2005), future 
research could explore ethnographically the work of decision-analysts within 
organizational contexts.  Such empirical studies will complement our analysis by 
allowing an in-depth understanding of the daily combination of rational decision-making 
practices within the flow of actions in context.  In so doing, these studies could contribute 
to an ethnomethodological understanding of how rationality ‘work’ in social and 
organizational life (Garfinkel 1967).  They could reveal for instance, the investments 
needed to sustain the rational part of strategy-making and show the role played by theory 
in structuring the work of a specific community of practice (Brown and Duguid 1991). 
Decision-Analysis:  A Fragile Performativity? 
A second contribution of the present study is to examine critically the 
performativity thesis by assessing the influence on organizational decision-making 
practices of the core axioms of economics.  Moving performativity studies from the 
financial marketplace to intra-organizational processes provides empirical evidence to 
(Ferraro et al. 2005)’s claim that the ‘rational man’ can be brought into being within 
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organizations.  It contradicts the received wisdom in organization theory that the 
‘textbook’ form of rational decision-making is not relevant and/or unrealistic.  The 
analysis of this organizational achievement however, points to the limitations of the work 
of decision analysts and the fragility of rational choice theory’s performativity.  Our study 
therefore contributes to consolidate the growing bodies of performativity studies by 
highlighting some conditions for the performance of the core axioms of economics.  
Studies of finance theory performativity demonstrate that theoretical abstraction and 
complexity are not necessarily obstacles to performativity (MacKenzie 2006).  They 
show that complex theories can be used to reframe the social reality; and then lead to 
enact behaviours validating their premises (Merton 1948; Ferraro et al. 2005).  However, 
financial markets are places where the performativity process is facilitated because 
traders, financial analysts and portfolio managers can count on a socio-technical and 
institutional market infrastructure.  This infrastructure supports their calculation, 
crystallises previous theory into practices and allows the progressive diffusion of 
sophisticated indicators (e.g. measures of volatility or beta) (MacKenzie 2006; 
MacKenzie and Millo 2003). 
By contrast, decision analysts are like Sisyphus.  They have to reconstruct part of 
the calculability infrastructure needed to perform rational choice theory in order to fit 
every single organizational context.  Though they are equipped with portable devices 
such as software or tools and can sometimes rely on pre-existing data produced by 
accountability or engineering systems in organizational contexts, they also have to devote 
important efforts to finding the judgmental inputs necessary for decision analysis.  The 
need for such data has led to the development of specific practices (e.g., elicitation 
techniques as part of interviews or focus groups).  Thus, if sociological studies of finance 
suggest that the performance of financial assumptions by traders on financial markets 
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could be compared to an actor performance of a play (the theory) in a real concrete 
theatre, with its stage (trading floor), its lights (on the computers and screens) and its 
seats (back office) already materialized (Callon 2007); our study of decision analysis 
applications rather suggests that the performance of the rational choice theory play is 
similar to ‘street theatre’.  A rough-and-ready stage has to be found (pre-existing 
quantified data), the present pedestrians (organizational actors) have to be mobilized and 
interested.  External events keep threatening the overall performance, and require from 
the decision analysts good improvisation skills (creative bricolage). 
Moreover, beyond revealing the conditions of the performance of the core axioms 
of economics, our study clarifies important boundaries of the performativity process 
directly related to the nature of the theory performed.  In the finance theory case of 
MacKenzie (2006, 2007) what is performed is a simple version of the expected utility 
model, called the ‘variance-mean model’ (pp.  45-67). The ‘variance-mean’ version of 
expected utility theory allows bypassing the modelling of investors’ subjective utility and 
subjective beliefs.  In most of Interfaces applications, however, subjective beliefs have 
been elicited, and in some cases, the utility function of the main decision-maker has been 
constructed.  This feature of rational choice theory delineates the boundaries of its 
performativity: the ‘conditions of felicity’ (Bourdieu, 1991) can be achieved only by 
relying on parameters that reflect the subjectivity of actors within each given 
organizational context. 
This comment also points to an important notion of the interplay of various 
dimensions in the potential performativity of rational theories.  Building on research on 
organizational design (Hatchuel 2001; Simon 1996), performativity scholars could study 
the interplay in the process of economics performativity, of three dimensions: theoretical 
design (the internal features of a theoretical framework), organizational design (the 
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capacity to create the social context within which a theory can be performed), and the 
engineering design (the materialization of assumptions through an assemblage of 
artefacts).  To empirically document the respective contribution of each dimension in the 
performativity process, future research could compare the degree of performativity of 
different rationalistic frameworks.  For instance, the performativity of decision theory 
could be compared to the peformativity of Taylor’s scientific management or agency 
theory. 
Making Decisions Calculable 
A third core finding of our study is that making decision rational implies enacting 
inside organizations an ‘infrastructure for calculability’.  Our study thus contributes to the 
analysis of the somewhat neglected role played by calculability in the craft of rational 
decision-making within organizations.  In studying decision analysts’ practices, we 
revealed that rational decisions are not only performed because they are discursive tools 
and conventional categories within which actors are embedded (Hendry 2000; Laroche 
1995) but also because these categories have been made ‘calculable’ (Callon 1998; Callon 
and Muniesa 2005).  To make decision theory entities and categories ‘calculable’, 
decision analysts build on calculative tools and practices already in place.  At the core of 
their practice however, is a work of creative bricolage that allows constructing new 
material and theoretical devices.   
Rational choice theory represents the rare case where measurement is dependent ‘on 
when, where, and by whom it is done’ (Power 2004: 769).  This theory indeed explicitly 
acknowledges that it is rests on subjective inputs see (Raiffa 2002: 181, for instance).  
This subtle positioning – between a ‘pure’ measurement work expurgating numbers from 
subjectivity and a ‘pure’ subjective judgment – might impede it from fully benefitting 
from the properties of quantification.  Proponents of a purely ‘objective’ approach to 
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decisions will criticise its subjectivist roots.  This was one of the main lessons of Pollock 
and Chen (1986) when they discovered their unsuccessful application of decision analysis 
in China could result from the fact that Chinese decision-makers were expecting ‘the 
computer program that would provide the optimal decision’.  On the other hand, 
proponents of a subjectivist perspective on decision will coin the quantification process as 
an ‘objectification’ process, and argue that constraining subjective judgments and values 
by a set of axioms expurgate them from their subjectivity.   
The decision analysis case lays out an interesting middle ground between these two 
extreme views.  It shows how decision engineers’ creativity sustains a form of 
‘judgement mechanization’ (Porter 1996) that structures but yet facilitates the expression 
of decision-makers’ subjectivity.  Future research on rational decision-making could 
study the organizational practices sustaining the whole spectrum of calculability 
situations located between a ‘purely objective’ calculability and a ‘purely subjective’ 
judgement.  Such analysis would benefit from the research stream exploring calculability 
in the context of market functioning (Callon and Muniesa 2005).  In particular, recent 
concepts from the sociological analysis of decision-making such as ‘qualculability’ 
(Cochoy 2002), ‘qualification’ (Musselin and Catherine 2005), or ‘judgement devices’ 
(Karpik 1996) could provide useful lenses to account for the various forms of 
calculability that enable organizational actors to make decisions. 
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TABLES 
Table I. The Axioms of Decision Analysis 
Axioms Description  
1a. Generation of Alternatives ‘At least two alternatives can be specified’. 
1b. Identification of consequences ‘Possible consequences of each alternative can be 
identified’. 
2. Quantification of judgment ‘The relative likelihoods or beliefs (i.e., probabilities) 
of each possible consequence that could result from 
each alternative can be specified’. 
3. Quantification of preference ‘The relative desirability (i.e., utility) for all possible 
consequences of any alternative can be specified’. 
4a. Comparison of alternatives ‘If two alternatives would each result in the same two 
possible consequences, the alternative yielding the 
higher chance of the preferred consequence is 
preferred’. 
4b. Transitivity of preferences ‘If one alternative is preferred to a second alternative 
and if the second alternative is preferred to a third 
alternative, then the first alternative is preferred to the 
third alternative’. 
4c. Substitution of consequences ‘If an alternative is modified by replacing one of its 
consequences with a set of consequences and 
associated probabilities (i.e., a lottery) that is 
indifferent to the consequence being replaced, then 
the original and the modified alternatives should be 
indifferent’. 
Source: created from Keeney (1982), pp. 830-832. 
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Figure 1. How Decision-Analysts Perform Rational Decision Theory through Practices: A Theoretical Model 
 
a
 The stages can be conceptually distinguished even if they may overlap in practice. There is always a possibility, not represented on this graphic, to come back to the previous stage when an important difficulty makes 
the achievement of one stage impossible.  The axioms numbered refer to Table 1. 
STAGE 1: CONTEXTUALIZATION 
ENACTING THE ‘DECISION 
CONTEXT’ 
Enacting axioms 1a and 1b 
ORGANIZATIONAL INPUT 
! Messy organizational problem 
! Uncertainty of the decisional 
context (actual or perceived) 
• Structured visual representation of 
the decision situation 
• List of decision items that could 
potentially be quantified 
e.g., an influence diagram; a “naked” 
decision tree 
STAGE 2: QUANTIFICATION 
MAKING THE DECISION CONTEXT 
CALCULABLE 
Enacting either axiom 2 or the set of 
axioms 2, 3, 4a, 4b and 4c 
STAGE 3: CALCULATION 
CALCULATING THE RATIONAL 
DECISION 
Maximizing the subjective expected 
utility of the decision-maker 
• Structured and quantified 
representation of the key elements of 
the decision situation that respects the 
axioms of decision theory 
e.g., a “dressed” decision tree with all 
the parameters completed 
• Final decision that is rational 
according to RCT 
• Optimal decision (or ranked set of 
options) that can be implemented 
e.g., a new marketing strategy, a 
location for a nuclear plant 
Stage of the 
performativity 
process (and 
axioms) 
a 
Outcome of 
the stage 
Input of the 
process 
GETTING THE CONTEXT RIGHT 
AND MAKING THE PROBLEM 
‘DECISION-ANALYZABLE’ 
• Socializing with actors from the 
field to collect data and understand 
the dimensions of the problem 
• Constructing choices’ alternatives 
• Using decision-trees or influence 
diagrams to structure the problem 
Illustrative 
practices of 
decision-
analysts 
TURNING DECISION ITEMS INTO 
NUMBERS 
• Identifying ‘hard’ data and obtaining 
them through negotiation with actors 
• Constructing reliable and credible 
missing data with various tools 
• Making actors and experts quantify 
their subjective estimations of crucial 
parameters in the decision problem 
APPLYING CALCULATIVE AND 
STATISTIC TECHNIQUES 
• Mobilizing software and calculative 
devices that embed theory to calculate 
optimal solutions 
• Programming or creative combination 
of tools for complex problem 
• Extending actors’ cognitive capacities 
by mobilizing computing tools 
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Figure 2: A ‘naked’ decision tree (Source: Ulvila 1987) 
 
 
Figure 3: The ‘Tinker Toy’ (Source: Dyer and Lund 1982) 
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Figure 4: A “dressed” decision tree (Source: Walls, Morahan, and Dyer 1995: 45) 
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Appendix - Table A. List of the 58 DA applications published in Interfaces (1970-2001) 
Date Authors Title (PA if Practice Abstract)  Application Area Company DA Tools Vol Iss. p. 
1980 Digman A decision analysis of the airline coupon strategy.   Manufacturing and 
Service (Strategy) 
United Airlines Decision Tree (DT) 10 2 97-101 
1980 Peck Communicating model based information for 
energy debates: two case studies.  
Public policy 
(Miscellaneous) 
US Gov DT.Communication/Facilit
ation (Com.) 
10 5 42-48 
1981 Dalkey A case study of a decision analysis: Hamlet's 
soliloquy.  
General None Probability assessment 
(PA) 
11 5 45-49 
1982 Ozernoy, Smith & 
Sicherman 
Evaluating computerized geographic information 
systems using decision analysis. 
Manufacturing and 
Service (Budget 
Allocation) 
Woodward-Clyde 
Consultants (WCC) 
Pb structuring 
/Formulation (Pb Struct) 
11 5 92-99 
1982 Dyer & Lund Tinker toys and Christmas trees: opening a new 
merchandising package for Amoco Oil Company. 
Manufacturing and 
Service (Strategy) 
Amoco Oil Pb Struct.; Utility 
assessment (UA); Com.  
12 6 38-52 
1983 Madden, Hynick 
& Hodde 
Decision analysis used to evaluate air quality 
control equipment for Ohio Edison Company. 
Energy (Product and 
Project Selection) 
Ohio Edisson DT; PA; Com. 13 1 66-75 
1984 Bell Bidding for the S.S. Kuniang. Energy (Bidding) New England Electric  DT 14 2 17-23 
1984 Cohan, Haas, 
Radloff &Yancik 
Using fire in forest management: decision making 
under uncertainty. 
Public Policy 
(Miscellaneous) 
3 US National Forests  DT 14 5 8-19 
1985 Winter. An application of computerized decision tree 
models in management-union bargaining. 
Manufacturing and 
Service (Miscellaneous) 
Large manufacturer 
of heavy industrial goods 
DT 15 2 74-80 
1986 Hosseini Decision analysis and its applications in the 
choice between two wildcat oil venture. 
Energy (Site selection) Tomco Oil Corp.  Com.  16 2 75-85 
1986 Luna & Reid Mortgage selection using a decision-tree 
approach. 
General  DT 16 3 73-81 
1986 Pollock & Chen Strive to conquer the black stink: decision 
analysis in the People's Republic of China. 
General Chinese Gov.  Com.  16 2 31-37 
1987 Clarke The application of decision analysis to clinical 
medicine. 
Medical  DT 17 2 27-34 
1987 Ulvila Postal automatic (ZIP+4) technology: a decision 
analysis 
Medical US Postal Service 
 
DT; PA 17 2 1-12 
1988 Heian & Gale Mortgage selection using a decision-tree 
approach: an extension. 
General   18 4 72-83 
1988 Ulvila Hindsight: the automatic zipper. Public Policy 
(Miscellaneous) 
US Postal Service 
 
Com.  18 1 74-77 
1988 Wenstop & 
Carlsen 
Ranking Hydroelectric Power projects with 
multicriteria decision analysis. 
Public Policy 
(Miscellaneous) 
Norwegian Gov.  Pb Struct; Com.  18 4 36-48 
1989 Alemi & Agliato Restricting patients' choices of physicians: a 
decision analytic evaluation of costs. 
Medical  DT; Com.  19 2 20-28 
1990 Feinstein Decision whether to test student athletes for drug 
use. 
Medical Santa Clara University Pb Struct; Com.; PA 20 3 80-87 
1991 Islei, Lockett, Cox 
& Gisbourne 
Modelling strategic decision making and 
performance measurements at ICI 
Pharmaceuticals. 
M&S (R&D project 
selection) 
ICI Pharmaceutical Strategy and/or objectives 
generation (Strat. Gen); 
Implementation (I) 
21 6 4-22 
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Table A (contd.) 
1991 Reagan-
Cirincione, et al. 
Decision modeling: tools for strategic thinking. Public Policy New York State Insurance 
Department 
Strat. Gen; Com.; Group 
issues 
21 6 52-65 
1992 Balson, Welsh & 
Wilson 
Using decision analysis and risk analysis to manage 
utility environmental risk. 
Energy (Environmental 
risk) 
Utility companies Pb Struct. PA 22 6 126-
139 
1992 Buede & 
Bresnick 
Applications of decision analysis to the military 
systems acquisition process. 
Military US Marine Corps.  Strat. Gen 22 6 110-
125 
1992 Engemann & 
Miller 
Operations risk management at a major bank. M&S (Finance) Bank Pb Struct.; I.  22 6 140-
149 
1992 Keeney & 
McDaniels 
Value-focused thinking about strategic decisions at 
BC Hydro. 
Energy (Strategy) BC Hydro Strat. Gen; UA;  Com.; I.  22 6 94-
109 
1992 Krumm & Rolle Management and application of decision and risk 
analysis in Du Pont. 
M&S (Strategy) Du Pont Strat. Gen; Pb Struct. ; 
Com.  
22 6 84-93 
1992 Kusnic & Owen The unifying vision process: value beyond 
traditional decision analysis in multiple-decision-
maker-environment. 
M&S (Strategy)  Strat. Gen; Com.; Group 
issues; I.  
22 6 150-
166 
1992 Quaddus, 
Atkinson & Levy 
An application of decision conferencing to strategic 
planning for a voluntary organization. 
M&S (Strategy)  Pb Struct. ; Com.;  
Group issues 
22 6 61-71 
1992 Vari &Vecsenyi Experiences with decision conferencing in Hungary. General  Com. ; Group issues; I. 22 6 72-83 
1993 Hess Swinging on the branch of a tree: project selection 
applications. 
M&S (Project selection) ICI Americas Pb Struct. ; SA 23 6 5-12 
1994 Millet A novena to Saint Anthony, or how to find inventory 
by not looking. 
M&S (Product planning) A nameless organization 
with a large logistical 
operation 
SA 24 2 69-75 
1994 Mulvey An asset-liability investment system M&S (Finance) Pacific Financial Asset 
Management Company  
 24 3 22-33 
1994 Paté-Cornell & 
Fischbeck 
Risk management for the tiles of the space shuttle General National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
PA; I.  24 1 64-86 
1995 Borison Oglethorpe Power Corporation decides about 
investing in a major transmission system. 
Energy (Product and 
project selection) 
Oglethorpe Power Corp. Pb Struct. ; Com.  25 2 25-36 
1995 Keefer  Facilities evaluation under uncertainty: pricing a 
refinery. 
Energy (Bidding and 
pricing) 
Oil company  
 
 25 6 57-66 
1995 Walls, Morahan 
& Dyer 
Decision analysis of exploration opportunities in the 
offshore US at Phillips Petroleum Company. 
Energy (Product and 
project selection) 
Phillips Petroleum Cy Pb Struct. ; UA; SA; I.  25 6 39-56 
1996 Taha & Wolf Evaluation of generator maintenance schedules at 
Entergy Electric System. 
Energy (Miscellaneous) Entergy Electric System  26 4 56-65 
1997 Brown Evaluation of vision correction alternatives for 
myopic adults. 
Medical None Strat. Gen; Pb Struct. ; SA  27 2 66-84 
1997 Burk & Parnell Evaluating future military space technologies. Military Air Force 
 
Strat. Gen; UA; I.  27 3 60-73 
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Table A (contd.) 
1997 Bruggink The Contribution of Project Analysis to an R&D 
Project at an Industrial R&D Center. 
M&S (R&D project 
selection) 
Alcoa Pb Struct. 27  107-
109 
1997 Stonebraker, Sage 
& Leak 
The contribution of project analysis to an R&D 
project at an industrial R&D center (PA) . 
M&S (R&D project 
selection) 
Ford Microelectronics Inc.  
(FMI) 
Pb Struct. 27 2 109-
111 
1998 Hazen, Pellissier,  
Sounderpandian 
Stochastic-tree models in medical decision making. Medical  Pb Struct.; UA 28 4 64-80 
1998 Hurley Optimal sequential decisions and the content of the 
fourth-and-goal conference. 
General   28 6 19-22 
1998 Toland, Kloeber 
& Jackson 
A comparative analysis of hazardous waste 
remediation alternatives. 
Energy (Technology 
choice) 
  28 5 70-85 
1998 von Winterfeld & 
Schweitzer 
An assessment of tritium supply alternatives in 
support of the US nuclear weapons stockpile. 
Energy (Technology 
choice) 
The Department Energy 
(DOE) 
Strat. Gen; Pb Struct.; 
PA; Com.  
28 1 92-
112 
1999 Bodily & Allen A dialogue process for choosing value-creating 
strategies. 
M&S (Strategy) A composite pharmaceutical 
firm 
Strat. Gen; Pb Struct. ; 
SA; Com.; I.  
29 6 16-28 
1999 Keeney Developing a foundation for strategy at Seagate 
Software. 
M&S (Strategy) Seagate Software Com.  29 6 4-15 
1999 Matheson D. & 
Matheson J.  
Outside-in strategic modeling. M&S (Strategy) Major oil Company  
 
Pb Struct. 29 6 29-41 
1999 Perdue,  
McAllister, King 
& Berkey 
Valuation of R and D projects using options pricing 
and decision analysis models. 
M&S (R&D project 
selection) 
West Valley Nuclear 
Services Cy, Westinghouse 
Science & Techn. Center  
Pb Struct. ; PA; SA 29 6 57-74 
1999 Perdue & Kumar Decision Analysis of High-Level Radioactive Waste 
Cleanup End Points at the West Valley 
Demonstration Project Waste Tank Farm (PA) . 
Energy (Strategy) Westinghouse Science & 
Technology 
Center 
Strat. Gen 29 4 96-98 
1999 Skaf Portfolio management un an upstream oil and gas 
organization. 
Energy (Strategy) Upstream oil & gas industry Strat. Gen; Com. I.  29 6 84-
104 
1999 Smith &Winkler Casey's problem: interpreting and evaluating a new 
test. 
Medical None Pb Struct. ; SA; I.  29 3 63-76 
2000 Keeney & Lin Evaluating Customer Acquisition at American 
Express Using Multiple Objectives. (PA) . 
M&S (Product planning) American Express  30 5 31-33 
2001 Beccue Choosing a development strategy for a new product at 
Amgen. (PA) . 
M&S (Product planning) Amgen  31 5 62-64 
2001 Clemen & Kwit The value of decision analysis at Eastman Kodak Cie. M&S (Strategy) Eastman Kodak Company  31 5 74-92 
2001 Dunning, et al.  New York Authority uses decision analysis to 
schedule refuelling of its Indian point 3 nuclear power 
plant. 
Energy (Miscellaneous) New York Power Authority Pb Struct. ; PA.  31 5 121-
135 
2001 Parnell Work-package-ranking system for the Department of 
Energy's Office of Science and Technology. (PA)  
Energy (Product and 
Project selection) 
Dpt. of Energy's Office of 
Science and Techn. 
 31 4 109-
111 
2003 Johnson & Petty Analyzing the Development Strategy for Apimoxin 
PA 
 Pharmaceutical industry  33 3 57-59 
 
